Firstly, it’s Heraclides, with an ‘a’

Secondly, you are doing a lot of arguing the person, not the material in your latest posts. Just a head’s up.

From the point of view of a reader, you have made changes. You might well have had these opinions for some time, but we can only work from what you present to us.

That doesn’t mean I didn’t correctly explain it to begin with, it just means that it’s becoming more familiar to you over time, and you jumped the gun with some of your attempted criticisms.

It equally means that you have later included things that were needed to understand your position on your earlier statements. I think “correct” is the wrong word to choose: “complete” might be better. There wasn’t enough information for the reader to understand you position without more information. Nothing wrong with that, everyone does it, so why make an excuse for it that pins the “blame” on the reader?

have another look – carefully. I actually pointed out that this regress is a problem and I rejected it by saying that we do not always have to know that we know. I said this explicitly, and yet you still made your comment anyway.

I can’t see that you have and saying that “we do not always have to know” doesn’t fix it. Firstly, whatever recursion escape” you chose would have apply in every single instance, not occasionally as “we do not always have to” implies. Secondly, it seems to me that adding “we do not always have to know” will only run into “do we know that we don’t need to know”, which will only introduce a different recursion (but one based around the same need to resolve the knowing).

Someone mentioned a long time back with words to the effect (as far as I can recall!) that they felt that the recursion of justification really had to stop with something somewhat arbitrary, e.g. a declaration that something was “good enough”. (I’m not saying I agree with this, but it’s one way of resolving it.)

You’re welcome to provide a quote for where you have “pointed out that this regress is a problem” and where you rejected it, I can’t see that you have done this. If you are referring to your statement that “we do not always have to know”, this doesn’t seem to do this.

Ken,

One can make the simplest comment and get jumped on, lectured at, given a good sermoning to, for it.

Add “banned from the blog” for it to the list.

I have been giggling about this image of a Thinking Matters cell meeting. Everyone is so dogmatic, so judgemental, that no-one dares inject a new idea for fear of retribution.

Nothing personal about those being referred to, but this general image is hilarious. Surely there is a Python sketch that works this theme?

think this suspicion (at least from our side) arises from the abstract nature of discussion, the unwillingness (or inability) to consider real situations and examples, which some philosophers indulge in.

For what it’s worth, I sometimes feel there is a similar suspicion between some classes of experimental and theoretical scientists. Sometimes this is even somewhat justified (in my opinion, of course!) For example, by theoretical biologists of those theoreticians that haven’t boned up enough on the “reality” of the system they’re studying. I’d have to flesh out examples for this to fully make sense, but I hope you get the general drift.

I really see little point in discussing this further with someone as untechable and arrogant as you, sicne you are allowing your ideological disagreement with my theological beliefs (something that I have not even brought into the simply definition of truth) that you’re just unwilling to engage reasonably. Sorry, that’s just how I see it.

Feel free to make whatever false and sweeping claims about “academics” who do not bow to your understanding of reality. The reality is, those who know better will not care or feel threatened, and those who don’t know any better will either not care or pat you on the back.

Enjoy the subject.

I think the problem is not just how you explain things – its how you understand things. That is why your characterisation of science can be so incorrect.

I think the jelly bean thought experiment was extremely telling (as is also perhaps your reaction after I developed it further). You did declare a “true belief” knowledge of 135 beans and no doubt felt I tricked you when I introduced the possibility (and evidence for) beans that didn’t interact with electromagnetic radiation.

My aim was to demonstrate to you the practical truth about investigating reality. With your attitude you would always think nature was tricking you, rather than realise that your own epistemological approach was the problem. Consequently you would not be able to develop a scientific understanding of reality, a knowledge which you have the humility to understand is always provisional.

Your understanding of “knowledge” was just not up to the situation. This is often the case with “academic’ understanding – that is why I raised Marx’s thesis in this regard.

That is why I think it is very arrogant of people who have an academic or theological understanding of philosophy claiming they can instruct us in this area. Even when they can’t actually give, or deal with, practical examples in debates like this!

Over the years I have sometimes visited colleagues working at universities and spent time in staff common rooms. I have noticed a strong demarcation between scientific and humanities staff. Scientific colleagues have often commented disparagingly on overheard conversations involving academic philosophers. And I am sure the demarcation was usually mutual.

I have picked up the same wariness and suspicions from scientists in other situations too and both philosophers and scientists do comment on the gap between them.

I think this suspicion (at least from our side) arises from the abstract nature of discussion, the unwillingness (or inability) to consider real situations and examples, which some philosophers indulge in.

On the other hand there are philosopher who are not remote from real science, who do keep themselves familiar with what is happening is science, and actually have the humility to learn something from this. I think we can and do actually develop extremely good and productive relationships with philosophers like this.

I would never advance the idea that scientists should “instruct” philosophers. But I believe the good philosophers actually do make the effort to study, and appreciate, scientific epistemology.

Firstly, I did explain my idea properly. It’s a new area for you as I think you agree, and you’re coming to grips with it. That doesn’t mean I didn’t correctly explain it to begin with, it just means that it’s becoming more familiar to you over time, and you jumped the gun with some of your attempted criticisms.

Secondly, you’re still misrepresenting me. I have explicitly stated that I do not think that knowledge is just true belief. My original blog post made ths clear in very simple terms. However you’re still saying:

Glenn’s reference to “epistemic externalism” at this late stage helps make his dogmatic insistence on knowledge as “true belief” more capable of interpretation.

So as you can see, you’re still misrepresenting my position, showing that the problem was not at my end when it comes to clarity.

Oh, Herclides, another thing: You accused me of falling intot he infinite regress problem when it comes to “knowing that we know.” have another look – carefully. I actually pointed out that this regress is a problem and I rejected it by saying that we do not always have to know that we know. I said this explicitly, and yet you still made your comment anyway.

The number onbe problem here is definitely haste on the part of Ken and Herclides, not taking the time to carefully read what they respond to, and as a result, misrepresenting me even after I have explicitly stated that I do not believe the things that they are attributing to me. I hope that this is not how you do science.

However, it never helps to react emotively in a discussion like this. (I sometimes wonder if feminists are right in their judgement of men being prone to “pissing competitions” and thereby avoiding proper discussion. Perhaps if more women participated here it might help?)

But, I have had to have a bit of a giggle. Precipitated really by our old friend Bnonn “commenting” over at Thinking Matters (http://talk.thinkingmatters.org.nz/2009/the-definition-game/). This sort of behaviour has led me, in the past, to describe Bnonn, Stuart, Matt and Glenn as “the angry young men from Thinking Matters.” One can make the simplest comment and get jumped on, lectured at, given a good sermoning to, for it.

I have been giggling about this image of a Thinking Matters cell meeting. Everyone is so dogmatic, so judgemental, that no-one dares inject a new idea for fear of retribution.

I have seen it all before – it only reinforces dogma.

Now, Glenn has called me a “relative newbie” wrt epistemology. I suppose I should be flattered at my age to have the term “newbie” associated with my name. However, it is a subject that has interested me for years – starting long before Glenn was born. I actually think that long consideration, and actual practical work in scientific research, which is very much about epistemology, produces a maturity.

I made this point, provocatively, in my reference to Marxist philosophy on the previous thread (July 31, 2009 at 11:09 am). Unfortunately, it didn’t get a response.

But I think this relationship between theory/philosophy and practice can be at the heart of many conflicts between theology and science.

Scientists develop a good intuitive understanding of epistemology – because they do it every day. Theologians can develop a good “academic, philosophical” vocabulary in the area – but nothing really beats experience.

While Glenn insists on presenting Platinga’s position in a very abstract manner, I can easily interpret comments like “a belief forming structure that is working as it should in a truth aimed way in an environment that is conducive to it providing reliable information.” After all, this could be a very rough abstract definition of the scientific process. But Platinga does make clear that it is his way of saying that this is only possible for a theist.

Cheers
Glenn.

Glenn, I take it you want to dismiss what I wrote out of hand. Fine, it’s your loss in my opinion.

(I’m replying to this as I read, not after I’ve read the whole post; short on time, etc.)

In your reply to Nick (and in your previous posts to me), you’re invoking circular logic or contradictions unless you weaken/refine your definition of knowledge. In particular, this paragraph runs straight into the points I raised in my previous post: On the general question of how [...]

That you’re calling for circular logic even follows directly from your statements, e.g. “how do you know that you know?” You’re using “know” in a recursive fashion, e.g. next it’ll be “how do you know, that you know, that you know?” … and on endlessly. You’re going to need something to escape that recursion. This was a point raised quite some time ago in a different form (justify the justifiers, etc.)

I maintain that We can know things without “knowing that we know” them.

Your latest addition does sounds like something that can be welded as an excuse to justify some of the things Ken raised, if someone chose to. (From Nick’s list: personal conviction, overwhelming belief, revelation, and a god-provided design enabling determination of truth.) Whatever strength it has in (sound) philosophy, I think there is good reason to be wary of the ease that it could be abused.

By the same token, I’d be wary of someone with an agenda (e.g. religious bias) trying to “resolve” this. Not saying that they “have” to get it wrong, just “caution needed here”.

Could I point out that despite dismissing me, you are in fact doing what I pointed out you’d have to do? I said you’d have to refine/change your definition of knowledge and here you are doing it. It seems that you want to work on the “justification” aspect, which is the aspect I pointed at. I’m not saying I agree (or not) with the particular way you’re going about it, just that it seems a bit silly to dismiss me only do the very thing I said you’d have to do.

Nick, part of the problem with merely reproducing comments from one blog to another is that it suggests that a reply is required in both places. I won’t be replying to the reproduced comment here, although I may offer further thoughts in the place you copied it from.

On the general question of how we can obtain 100% certainty, surely you see that this question is not a challenge to the standard definition of knowledge that I defend. It’s a question of a different sort, not “how can we have knowledge,” but “how can we be sure that what we have is knowledge.” An analogous question would be, rather than “what is warrant,” asking “how can we obtain the psychological stance of certainty about whether our belief is warranted.”

Don’t get me wrong, it’s not an uninteresting question. I just wanted to make it clear that this line of questioning is not a challenge to the standard definition of knowledge.

Essentially, it’s like asking, not “how do you know?” but rather “how do you know that you know?”

Although the answer I am about to give is fairly run of the mill in epistemology, it might be unfamiliar and unusual sounding to some here: I maintain that We can know things without “knowing that we know” them. This position is called epistemic externalism (I’d recommend googling it and becoming familiar with it before anyone decides to attack it). In fact, I think the alternative (internalism) is deeply flawed. If, for everything that we know, we also have to “know that we know” it, then we cannot actually know anything at all, because this creates an infinite regress.