Marriage equality, retribution and moral progress

Retribution?
“The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” by Dürer

Colin Craig, leader of New Zealand’s Conservative party, is upset at last night’s parliamentary vote supporting marriage equality. On twitter (@ColinCraigNZ) he warned “The day of reckoning is still to come.” Some Catholic Bishops in Auckland issued a similar warning.

The religious connotations are obvious – war, pestilence, etc. But Craig’s press release hints at electoral consequences for parliament ignoring the expressed will of the people. He said: “Last night was not a vote of the people of New Zealand. If it had been, the answer would have been no.” (sic). And went on to claim: “Next year’s election will be the opportunity for New Zealanders to finally have their say. . . . . we expect our support to continue to increase.”

The Catholic Bishops also implied that the next election might see loss of support for those MPs who supported the law as an angry electorate took vengeance.

Craig and those bishops should get out more. Polling has shown majority support in New Zealand for marriage equality. And comments in the twitter stormduring the parliamentary debate last night indicated people were considering electorally supporting good speakers even though they represented political parties they hated.

The overwhelming assessment of the parliamentary debate on this legislation was that it was a high quality, reasoned and non-partisan approach made possible by the conscience vote. Bloody hell, the parliament TV channel must have had a huge following – patrons in bars and at parties were watching the debate. On this issue parliament TV was the best viewing of the night.

Watch Maurice Williamson’s speech on the legislation

Human rights the issue

The legislation was passed by an overwhelming majority (77 to 44). Members of parliament supporting the legislation impressed in their speeches because they were arguing in favour of human rights, and removal of discrimination. That resonated with viewers – and will do those speakers no harm in the next elections.

The few MPs speaking against the legislation instead argued for “tradition,” “authority” and conservative religious, even supernatural, morality.

I think this illustrates a clear difference in foundational values some moral psychologists describe as underlying human morality. I have written about this in reviewing Jonathan Haidt’s book The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (see Morality and the “worship” of reason and Human morality is evolving).

Haidt lists six foundational values in human morality:

1. Care/Harm
2. Fairness/Cheating
3. Loyalty/Betrayal
4. Authority/Subversion
5. Sanctity/Degradation
6. Liberty/Oppression

I think this is a useful hypothesis (although I don’t agree with his conclusions about political values and the way he treats each foundational value as equal). We all have underlying intuitions and values driven by these sort of instincts.  However, I just don’t treat all these “foundational values” as equal. Or the resulting moral outlooks as always valid.

While these instincts evolved in humans, and some other animals, some, to me, seem more valid in today’s society. For example, foundational values related to survival, harm and care seem fundamental, arising naturally from the inherent biological value of survival. But those related to purity, sanctity authority, etc., while often relying on instincts developed for survival (eg purity of food), are actually hijacked to emotionally justify features of society and religion.

Foundational values of purity are important in considering unusual food, authority and loyalty in times of war, natural catastrophe, etc. But purity in considering beliefs, social arrangements like marriage and sexual relations? Authority and loyalty when considering behaviour in a democratic and pluralist, multi-belief and secular society? I think in the latter situations these foundational values are being misused and the moral conclusions are unjustified. They are relying on the hijacking of human instincts to give emotional support for outmoded social relations.

The moral drift?

Many people have commented that the marriage equality legislation is long overdue – others have commented  that “it is time.” Clearly it’s passing is possible now, and not 5 or 10 years ago, because of the change in our moral outlook. Conservatives may lament that – they may see this moral change as a decay or degradation. Others (the majority in this case) see it as progress.

But in terms of Haidt’s “foundational values” I see it as society giving more credence to foundational values related to survival, care, harm, fairness, liberty and human rights. And giving less credence to foundational values related to loyalty, authority, purity, sanctity and sacredness in human relations.

I think that is progress.

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Talking sense about morality

Here’s a great blog post by Jerry Coyne outlining a scientific approach to morality (see How should we be moral?: Three papers and a good book) it gives a summary of his current ideas and a reading list of papers and a book which have influenced him.

I go along with Jerry’s conclusions but I would add a couple of things  to his summary:

1. I agree that there is no such thing a objective morality – but let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water. I think we can show an objective basis for morality. We can understand how some of our values have an objective basis (others may not) and this is important in our evaluation of moral codes.
2. I think we should extend our understanding of an instinctual morality model (as opposed to a rational one) beyond the simple proposition of an evolutionary origins of our instincts. We need to see that the instincts or intuitions driving our moral feelings or emotions can also develop, or evolve, via cultural mechanisms. I think this is important to understanding of the moral zeitgeist, the way that our moral codes tend to change over time.

An objective basis for morality?

There is a difference between objective morality – which implies some sort of moral truth existing independently of humanity – and objectively based morality. This latter implies that there is a basis for our morality – the nature of our species – which means that we generally come to the same moral conclusions. Our morality is not just a matter of personal choice.

I see the simplest basis of morality in the simple facts of life itself. Living organisms, even the most primitive, have the property of valuing life and its continuation. Without this basic biological value such organisms would not survive and reproduce. Just imagine a simple organism which ignored indications of nutrients in its environment and had no ability, or “desire,” to reproduce. Natural selection would soon have put paid to it.

While initial organisms may have had simple physical and chemical mechanisms putting biological value into effect evolution eventually led to development of neuronal structures and brains. Biological value could be expressed as instincts and emotions.

Evolution of social animals provided requirements for a finer structure to biological value. The interactions between organisms became more important and this finer structure became represented in the instincts and emotions of social animals – including humans.

Long story short – I see an objective basis for human morality in human nature itself. The fact that we are a sentient, intelligent, conscious, social and empathetic species.

Hijacking human instinct

Of course, there is not necessarily a direct line between our evolved instincts, objectively based in biological and social value, and the morality we profess.  Jonathan Haidt described his useful theory of foundational moral values in his recent book The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (see my review in Human morality is evolving). While some of our moral codes related to life, care, harm and well-being are related to foundational human values involved with life and its survival – biological and social value – others are not. Or at least they are driven by instincts which have been hijacked. For example instincts of purity may well be related to survival and life, but moral codes related to sacredness, racial superiority and religious purity (unrelated to life and survival) rely on the hijacking of such instincts.

So while I assert that there is an objective basis for some of our morality – especially that related to life, care, harm and well-being –  some of our morality may well not have a genuine objective basis, even though it utilises basic human instincts.

Moral learning and moral zeitgeist

A simple instinctive model of morality, relying on evolved instincts and not conscious deliberation, really doesn’t explain how and why human morality changes. It doesn’t explain the moral zeitgeist.

I think it’s necessary to include both rational consideration as well as instinctive, emotional reaction, to explain this. As Jerry said, our “instinctive judgments are largely a product of evolution.” But it doesn’t stop there. Our intuitions, and hence our emotions, are produced unconsciously, without delineation, but over time they are influenced by our conscious deliberation and learning.

When we learn to ride a bike, or even to walk as a toddler, our actions are deliberate. We consciously consider them and put them into effect. But with learning these actions no longer need conscious deliberation. They are incorporated into our unconscious brain and carried out automatically. Just as well – imagine that adults had to continue all the conscious activity the toddler uses when they start walking. With all the inevitable conscious mistakes. Just imagine grown-ups walking along the footpath, but every so often falling on their backside like a toddler! Because the process of walking had not been learned and incorporated into their unconscious.

I argue, that the conscious moral deliberations of individuals and society produce the same sort of learning. These deliberation may be active – as, for example, our current discussion of marriage equality. Or the learning could be almost passive. Exposure to our culture. I think many people have unconsciously shifted their attitudes towards working mothers, racial integration and homosexuals because of their exposure to TV shows, books, and life itself, where these modern moral attitudes are accepted.

Incorporation of this moral learning into our subconscious means that  homosexuality, for example, no longer automatically provokes our instincts of purity and disgust. Or meeting an atheist no longer causes us to react out of disgust or respect for authority.

So while our day-to-day moral functioning relies on these intuitional reactions and not logical consideration, these unconscious intuitional reactions have been modified by our learning and exposure to cultural changes.

Moral progress?

On the one hand, that moral attitudes related to care, life, harm and well-being can have an objective basis in biological value, in the very nature of life, means we have ways – both emotional and logical – at arriving at common agreement on what is “right” and “wrong.” On the other hand, although our morality is instinctive or intuitional and not rational (at least in common day-to-day activity) the deliberate intellectual consideration of moral issues, as well as our passive exposure to a culture which is changing because of that deliberate consideration, means that we are capable of moral learning. Of adjusting our automatic moral reactions over time. Of making moral progress.

And I think we can conclude that this has happened on issues such as human rights and discrimination – even if not uniformly and evenly.

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Moral evolution in today’s society

This post is the last in a series on human morality (see, Objective or subjective laws and lawgivers, Subjective morality – not what it seems? and Drifting moral values). These are not meant as an academic treatment of the subject (as one commenter (OS) seemed to think). As I said in my first post, I am responding to ideas presented by Zach Weinersmith and Sean Carroll  about subjective and objective morality on their blogs (see Pankration Ethics and Morality and Basketball) and taking the opportunity to clarify my own ideas about physical laws and moral laws. That’s what blogs are for aren’t they?

So I welcome comments and genuine criticisms.

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The camera metaphor for human morality describes an “auto mode” were we react unconsciously to situation and make our moral judgements and decisions without rational consideration (see Subjective morality – not what it seems?). We may attempt to explain later the reasoning behind those decisions, but psychologists like Jonathan Haidt point out these are actually rationalisations, not description of actual reasons. While this is the mode we use most of the time, there is also the “manual mode” — where we do attempt to reason through moral situations (see Drifting moral values). We may be rehearsing our rationalisations. But we also may be participating in public discussion. The current discussion on the marriage equality bill is an example.

But these two modes are not mechanically separated as in a camera. It’s not a matter of flipping a switch or making a choice of modes. And as I said before even when someone is consciously reasoning they are still influenced by their unconscious feelings and emotions. But I think it’s also important to realise our “auto” moral mode is not static. It is over time influenced by what goes on in our conscious mind (the activity of our “manual” moral mode) – and in our surrounding environment.

Learning

The normal learning process usually involves a transfer of consciously rehearsed reasoning or action into our subconscious. What we initially learn to do consciously, and therefore requires concentration and mental effort, eventually becomes embedded in our subconscious and we do it without thinking. Consider how you learned to ride a bike or drive a car and how this eventually became an unconscious skill.

Cordelia Fine describes how during the learning process our conscious mind eventually delegates responsibility to our unconscious mind in her book A Mind of Its Own: How Your Brain Distorts and Deceives.

“Everyday activities like walking and driving perfectly illustrate the importance of being able to delegate responsibility to the unconscious mind. This point was vividly brought home to me as I observed my small son learning how to walk. When he was twelve months old it was an activity requiring the utmost concentration. No other business—receiving a proffered toy, taking a sip of water, even surveying the pathway ahead for obstacles—could be conducted at the same time. Imagine if this carried on throughout life, with passersby on the street plopping clumsily to their bottoms should you distract them for an instant by asking for directions. But fortunately, the unconscious gradually takes over. The previously tricky aspects of walking—balancing upright, moving forward, the whole left-foot-right-foot routine— become automatic and mentally effortless. And once a skill moves into the domain of the unconscious mind, we free up conscious thought for other matters. The learning driver is a poor conversationalist because his conscious mind is fully taken up with the complexities of steering, changing gears, and indicating. As driving becomes automatic, we can offer something a little more fulfilling to our front seat companion than a series of fractured mutterings and muffled cries of “Sorry!” Precious conscious thought becomes available again.”

Just imagine if every skill your “learned” had to be performed consciously. We just could not operate that way, and its the same with our day-to-day social interactions and moral judgements. We just could not have survived as a species if all that we learned required deliberate engagement of the conscious process every time we used it. We wouldn’t just be “plopping clumsily on bottoms” when distracted while we were walking. We just wouldn’t react quickly enough to life threatening situations. And we would find life in a society of people impossible.

So I think that our conscious deliberation on moral issues, as might occur when we are taught by parents or other adults, or when we take part in discussions and decisions, does make changes in our subconscious mind. The exercise of our “manual mode” then leads to changes in our “auto mode.” For example, learning about, or discussing, the consciousness of other animals, their ability to feel pain and emotions, may eventually lead to someone who was originally a meat eater to automatically feel repelled by meat dishes.

Mind you, teaching by an adult does not necessarily lead to an “auto” moral mode which produces the right result from the perspective of a modern humane person. Consider, for example, the sort of learning that goes on in families belonging to inhumane religious sects. Many children from these families grow up to automatically associate strong women, racial minorities or homosexuals with a feeling of disgust.

Even mainline Christian denominations and sects tend to continually argue for the status quo or return to previous moral norms. They seem to particularly react against political and social pressure to update laws and moral codes on the basis of reasoned and collective discussion and evidence. This results in such organisations continually being seen as backward and conservative.

Cultural learning

A tremendous amount of our learning occurs involuntarily, and not in formal lessons, lectures and sermons. For many adults this may be the only way we continue to learn. We may not be aware of it, but we are continually learning while being entertained. And I don’t mean via advertisements – more through “product placement.”

Entertainment it’s a relatively painless way of learning. Of course, as many people comment, we may be learning a load of rubbish. Not just about foods and fashions, but also about social attitudes – which eventually end up influencing our “auto” moral mode.

But, because our entertainment reflects features of our society it also often reflects good changes in our society. Or at least helps to make acceptable things and people we may have otherwise had negative feelings about. Today it is relatively common to see homosexuals and homosexual relationships presented in a positive way in TV drama, films and soap operas. Similarly we have developed a more accepting attitude towards single parent families, to women working. Even to strong professional women because we have become used to seeing them day-to-day in these dramas and soap operas.

Positive presentation in fictional drama also enables positive presentation in real life. Homosexuals have been “coming out” – we all become aware that our friends and acquaintances may be homosexual. These a real people and this breaks down those old negative associations we may have previously learned.  In recent years a similar thing has happened with atheists, especially in the USA. The word is losing its negative connotations.

TV may be particularly effect in this cultural learning but it is a relatively new phenomena. I think literature and art have also provided an important medium for cultural learning over the years, and well before modern methods of communication. Many timeless moral situations and dilemmas, as well as topical issues, have been covered by literature and drama. Possibly one of the most important things parents can do to ensure the moral education of their children is to encourage reading, and allow access to a variety of genre.

Swings and roundabouts

I have conceded that cultural layering may be promoting some acceptance of rubbish as well as negative moral attitudes. That’s an inevitable downside. But as long as there are some people in society who engage their “manual” moral mode and take part in society-wide discussion of topical moral issues there is scope for the passive cultural learning by the rest of society. I have argued that there is an objective basis for human moral values in human nature.  The fact that we are a sentient, intelligent, social and empathetic species. These discussions offer an arena for the objectively based human moral values to exert their influence.  In effect it is the manual moral mode of society’s leaders and thinkers, of our writers, artists and actors, who have enabled a reasoned consideration based on positive moral value to influence the “auto” moral mode of the rest of society.

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Human morality is evolving

I want to give some of my final thoughts on   Jonathan Haidt‘s book – The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. In Morality and the “worship” of reason my interim judgement (after reading one third of the book) was favourable – but I had concerns. Now, having finished the book, my judgement overall is very critical. I don’t think it’s a book I can truly recommend (except for the first third).

Partly because I feel Haidt really uses the later parts of the book to promote his own hobby horses – prejudices about atheism (or the “New Atheists” – whoever they are), political ideology and the role of religion in morality and society. But also because his scientific analysis of human morality was too reductionist – in a bad way.

Why badly reductionist?

Throughout the book I was acutely aware Haidt’s analysis was of human morality – as it exists. To his credit, as it exists in several different societies. To me its important philosophically to study things in their environments.

But the big mistake was to study human morality as a static phenomenon – he didn’t investigate it in its development, as a constantly changing, evolving thing. (Again I think the investigation of things in their development is philosophically important).

The fact is human morality in most cultures is evolving. And there are huge factors in today’s world which make this inevitable, probably even escalate moral evolution.

A role for reason in moral evolution?

So yes it is useful for Haidt to draw out two principles in his book:

1: Morality is about emotions, not rationality. Our emotions enable us to react quickly in moral situations and our intelligence enables us to “explain” why after the fact. Haidt’s slogan is “Intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second.”

2: His second slogan is “There’s more to to morality than harm and fairness.” He describes six different foundations underlying human morality:

• Care/Harm;
• Liberty/oppression;
• Fairness/cheating;
• Loyalty/betrayal;
• Authority/subversion;
• Sanctity/degradation.

But he does little to elucidate the role of intelligence and reason in moral change and evolution. He limits this to only the possible education of one person by interacting with another (and hence inhibiting somewhat our inbuilt desire to rationalise rather than reason properly). But ignores the much wider role of society in general, especially in today’s world of modern communication and entertainment, mass entertainment, the internet, etc.

Also, in concentrating on the six different intuitive or instinctive foundations of human morality – as it exists – he does not investigate the relative roles of these intuitions, and their resultant human values, in the evolution of human morality and laws.

How do we change human morality?

Obviously this is not simple. Nor is it always, everywhere, and for everyone a rational process. A result of reasoning, discussion and democratic decision.

But, despite all these other factors we should recognise that reasoning, rational discussion and democratic decisions are involved. Look back over your own life time. In my case I have seen huge evolution in aspects of human morality like attitudes towards discrimination – racial, gender and even species. For the average person in the street these changes may have occurred subconsciously – because of changes in social acceptance of women and gays, of interracial marriage, etc., or because they were habituated to a new morality by what they saw on TV or read in books. But this was also accompanied by the intelligent debate that occurred, and is occurring in society. The challenging of old prejudices. The argument for recognition of human rights, etc. Even the passing of anti-discrimination laws – which of course require intelligent discussion and decision.

So while a static view of human morality must emphasise that emotion comes first, rationalisation after, when we look at the evolution of human morality in today’s society we must recognise an important role for reason, intelligent discussion and decisions.  So, I think there is a lot of value in Haidt’s metaphor comparing our subconscious feelings and emotions to an elephant -(which usually goes its own way) and our conscious and intelligent reasoning to its driver (who thinks he is in control). But using that metaphor there are times when those drivers can educate the elephant. Train it out of old habits and into new ones.

What role for Haidt’s moral foundation theory?

And what role do the six foundations of morality Haidt identifies play in the the evolution of human morality. Well of course they operate at the non-conscious, non-reasoning, emotional level – and continue to. But when it comes to intelligent collective discussion and deliberation of moral issues I don’t think they have the same importance.

Yes, citizens of a specific nation may argue for recognition of authority, loyalty and purity when it comes to discussing laws and acceptable behaviour regarding oaths, respect for the national flag, etc. But in a modern, pluralist society such foundations will not play the same role when consider laws and behaviour on blasphemy, defamation of religion, genital mutilation, freedom of speech, freedom of association, marriage equality, gender equality, discrimination, rights of individuals, etc. When we come to applying reasoning and rational discussion to human issues the values based on the foundation of harm and care will be dominant.

That’s not to say the values based on purity, authority, sacredness, etc., won’t be involved. Just that in a modern pluralist democratic society these cannot play a controlling role. Partly this is just a fact of the way democracy must work in a pluralist society. Minorities should not get the freedom to override and dominate majorities. But it is also based on the reality that there is actually a more objective basis for the foundations of harm and care than there is for the other foundations. That objective basis is fundamental to biological life (how could it be otherwise – life would not have survived and evolved without these objective biological values).

Looked at this way – seeing human morality in its development and not as a static phenomenon – leads, I think, to quite different conclusions to those drawn by Haidt. He sees liberals as being at a disadvantage because they give more relevance to the foundations of care/harm, Liberty/oppression and fairness/cheating than conservatives who actually include, and give similar emphasis to the other foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation). He argues that therefore conservative understand human morality better than liberals and politically they communicate better with others.

But I see conservatives as playing an undermining role in the development, evolution, of human morality because they are actually less concerned with the values based on care/harm liberty/oppression and fairness/cheating than on those values which are in fact secondary, do not have an objective basis, which are based on loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation.   And I suggest that if we look back over our own lifetimes we can see that in fact political conservative have generally not lead movements for moral progress. They have worked to undermine moral progress by appealing to those secondary, less basic, foundations.

Atheists who promote religion?

It turns out that Haidt is another one of these atheists who actually see a positive role for religion and therefore are hostile to the so-called “New Atheists’ and others critical of the role of relgion in today’s society. They wish these “strident,” and “militant” atheists would STFU – because they feel such criticism undermines the very foundation of social cohesiveness and human morality.

Haidt uses (opportunistically and unthinkingly I think) a model of group selection to justify a determining role for religion in preserving society. Let the evolutionary biologists take him to task over that one. But it enables him to advance the slogan “Morality binds and blinds,” to substitute religion for morality as a force which provides our social glue and leadership.

He expresses it this way:

“Religions are moral exoskeletons. If you live in a religious community, you are meshed in a set of norms, relationships, and institutions that work primarilty on the elephant to influence your behaviour. But if you are an atheist living in a looser community with a less binding moral matrix, you might have to rely somewhat more on an internal moral compass, read by the rider. …… When societies lose their grip on individuals, allowing all to do as they please, the result is often a decrease in happiness and an increase in suicide . …”

And he warns atheists:

“Societies that forgo the exoskeleton of religion should reflect carefully on what will happen to them over several generations. We don’t really know, because the first atheistic societies have only emerged in Europe in the last decades. They are the least efficient societies ever known at turning resources (of which they have a lot) into offspring (of which they have few).”

Again, let those who are concerned about the populations explosion, limited resources and ecological damage to our environment deal with that last sentence. But, personally I think his approach is cowardly and unrealistic (as well as unjustifiable righteous).

Cowardly because it expresses fear about the changes in human morality and moral understanding already underway. And unrealistic because it appeals to old institutions and beliefs to solve new problems in new situations. Yes, this does mean that more people will be appealing to their own inner moral compass – but when has development of a sense of moral autonomy been a bad thing.  And yes there will be, already are, new institutions and new communities. That is inevitable in a modern society with modern forms of communication and creation of communities. And modern understandings where appeal to supernatural guidance is far less effective.

Yes that does mean the old religious moral exoskeletons may disappear. But I don’t think moral exoskeletons in general will. In fact I think we are creating new ones all the time. And perhaps the much hated “New Atheists” are encouraging formation of these new exoskeletons by their activity.

Human society and human morality is not static. They will inevitably evolve. And our investigations of morality this should recognise this evolution.

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Morality and the “worship” of reason

I have so far read about one-third of  Jonathan Haidt‘s new book – The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. I still highly recommend it – but I think some of his claims need strong criticism.

The first part of his book provides a really useful and fascinating (for the lay person anyway) summary  of what he calls his “first principle of moral psychology” – intuitions come first, reasoning second.  We rely on institutions for our moral reactions in most situations, but then, if asked, we will use reason to rationalise those actions. Sometimes we can’t actually provide very good justifications.

I think this aspect of human psychology in important – and relevant to lots of areas apart from human morality. But the fact that we do this should not be used to denigrate reason.

Intelligence is like sex

Human intelligence and reason may well have evolved naturally to handle situations our ancestors faced. And there was never an evolutionary requirement for an organism to know the “truth” about reality, purely to handle the situations it faced. However, like sex which humans use for other purposes than simple procreation, intelligence and our ability to reason enables us to investigate and come to understandings about reality – a reality which our ancestors never had to deal with let alone comprehend.

I think this is important to how we should consider reason. True, the individual more often uses reason like a lawyer, rather than a scientist. To justify one’s actions or support one’s predetermined beliefs, rather than get at the truth. But we can also use it to get at the truth – and I think that is valuable. So I agree – using reason like a lawyer may not be exactly noble (even though we all do it) but I certainly don’t put the discovery of truth into that class.

Delusional reasoning

After describing this modern synthesis on moral psychology Haidt asserts – “Anyone who values truth should stop worshipping reason.” I will leave aside his emotional use of the word “worship” for the moment and just point out that Haidt has put himself in a bind – how is he going to determine truth without reason?

This impossible situation seems to scream out from his next sentence – “We all need to take a cold hard look at the evidence and see reasoning for what it is.” How does he imagine taking this “cold hard look” without using reason?

Of course his problem is that he is using “reason” almost in a pejorative sense – “motivated reasoning” – the reason of a lawyer, not a scientist.

Elsewhere Haidt does clarify “I’m not saying we should all stop reasoning and go with our gut feelings. . . .Rather, what I am saying is that we must be wary of any individual’s ability to reason.” We are all partisan and prone to confirmation bias but we overcome this, especially in scientific endeavours, by reasoning socially – in groups where “some individuals can use their reasoning powers to discomfirm the claims of others.”

Now , that’s better. Reasoning is a good thing, even though it is often motivated.  But why denigrate those who support reason by calling that “worship”? He goes further – “As an intuitionist. I’d say that the worship of reason is itself an illustration of on of the most long-lived delusions in western history: the rationalist delusion.”

The caricature of “new atheism”

Perhaps his motive is revealed by that word “delusion.”  He adds that some people see reason as bringing “us beyond the ‘delusion’ of believing in gods (for the New Atheists).” Perhaps he is really having a bash at these so-called ‘new atheists” who he has a hang-up about. (I referred to his preoccupation in that area in my recent post Conservatives, liberals and purity.) Haidt even refers to Richard Dawkins’ “childrearing advice” (“utopian program for raising more rational children”) in The God Delusion.

Haidt’s presentation of “new atheism” is a sad caricature. It is silly to characterise as a “utopian progam” the raising of one’s children to ask the question “How do you know that?”, to look for the evidence supporting ideas and claims, and to try to apply reasoning to questions they face.  After all, I can imagine discussing with my grandchildren the ideas of moral psychology Haidt describes in his book. Explaining  how humans very often reason like a lawyer rather than a scientist. And the importance of having input from a range of perspectives.  Is Haidt going to describe that as a “utopian program,” a “rationalist delusion” and the “worship” of reason? Come off it Jonathan.

Ethics education?

However, even worse than this Dawkins’ bashing” is Haidt’s apparent rejection of ethics education. He says:

“if our goal is to produce good behaviour, not just good thinking, then it’s even more important to reject rationalism and embrace intuitionism. Nobody is ever going to invent an ethics class that makes people behave ethically after they step out of the classroom.”

I think that is not only naive – it is just plain wrong. And it is denigrating what could be an effective contribution to the ethical education of children. Especially as he offers no real alternative.

And this is, I think, one of the weaknesses in Haidt’s analysis – a mechanical tendency to see intuition and reason as opposite and ignoring their interaction. Sure our moral actions are intuitive, not immediately based on reason. However, out intutions are not static – they can actually be altered by reason. This happens in learning, when a new action or idea needs to be consciously rehearsed at the start but in time becomes incorporated into our unconscious and becomes automatic. It becomes intuitive. Haidt concedes this may sometimes occur when an individual with a different idea comments on one’s actions. But he ignores the very important role of society, at a number of levels, in helping form and change our moral intuitions.

Personally, I think ethics classes where children get to discuss and suggest solutions to common moral issues could play a valuable role in the moral upbringing of our children. Sure, no student walks out of a class and immediately applies all they have learned in a lesson (in mathematics as well as ethics). But surely Haidt can see that education, especially that supplemented by the inevitable relevant real day-to-day activities does lead to intuitional changes.

While reading this book I can’t help thinking from time to time that the book itself is an example of motivated reasoning, of Haidt’s own partisanship and prejudices. Perhaps that’s how it should be and how the reader should see any book.  And Haidt even admits the possibility of his own bias:

“I have tried to make a reasoned case that our moral capacities are best described from an intuitionist perspective. I do not claim to have examined the question from all sides, nor to have offered irrefutable proof. Because of the insurmountable power of the confirmation bias, counterarguments will have to be produced by those who disagree with me. Eventually, if the scientific community works as it is supposed to, the truth will emerge as a large number of flawed and limited minds battle it out”

Now that would be putting the best of Haidt’s scientific ideas into practice.

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Conservatives, liberals and purity

I have just started reading Jonathan Haidt‘s new book. Its called The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion and was released a few days back.

Personally, I have learned a lot from Haidt’s writings and research on moral psychology. I certainly recommend his previous book The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom. So I am intrigued by the current book.

However, I do find some of his current claims, made in recent interviews and lectures, a bit disturbing. Perhaps he is being more political than he has in the past. (This seems to be the American season for political books. Chris Mooney has also recently published The Republican Brain: The Science of Why They Deny Science–and Reality. Looks interesting). Or perhaps this reflects changes in Haidt’s own political views. (He says he used to be “liberal” but has now moved more to a “centrist” position).

1: Are conservatives more “understanding” than liberals?

Haidt seems to suggest they are. He bases this on his “moral foundations” theory. (see www.MoralFoundations.org).  This “proposes that six (or more) innate and universally available psychological systems are the foundations of “intuitive ethics.” Each culture then constructs virtues, narratives, and institutions on top of these foundations, thereby creating the unique moralities we see around the world, and conflicting within nations too.”

I see this as arguing that human morality is based on a number of subconscious or emotional  instincts or intuitions. He lists: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, Liberty/oppression, Loyalty/betrayal and Authority/subversion. Have a look at the above link for his detailed description of these. He then has used on-line social surveys of a large number of people to identify the relevance placed on these different instincts by different (self-described) political groups. (By the way, there is a need to define terms here because “liberal” means something different in the US to what it does elsewhere. As Haidt says in his book: “Readers from outside the United States may want to swap in the words progressive or left-wing whenever I say liberal.”)

The results from his survey have been in the literature for a while and are repeated in his new book. The figure illustrates the main point – conservatives give more moral relevance to sanctity, purity, disgust, and authority than do “liberals.”

OK – I can see that. It’s not surprising. But my problem is the conclusion he draws in recent lectures and interviews. (see for example the Blogging Heads discussion with Robert Wright). There he has claimed that conservatives are naturally more understanding of “liberals” because they share the same importance of instincts like care and fairness. But, on the other hand, “liberals’ cannot understand conservatives because they don’t share the same relevance of authority and purity.

If this were true there should be some empirical evidence – and I can’t see it. Especially in the US. But the figure does not say that “liberals” do not share those instincts related to purity, etc. Just that they don’t give them the high relevance conservatives do in their intuitive moral choices.

Haidt appears to want to remove authority and purity from the “liberal’s” instinctual menu – just because of difference placed on relevance! in one case!

Actually, later on in the Blogging Head’s discussion he appears to do an about-turn when he criticises “liberal” academics for invoking a purity instinct when they avoid, or even refuse to allow, any research or discussion of racial differences. He asserts that “liberals” sanctify questions of race – and hence ring-fence it.

I like his moral foundations theory and its use to “explain” political differences in attitude. But I suspect his conclusion about conservatives “understanding” “liberals” (and therefore being able to listen to and communicate with them better than their political opponents) is an example of his “centrist” wishful thinking –  or even political bias.

And he certainly has not supported that conclusion empirically.

2: Preoccupation with “new atheism”

Perhaps this is part of his “new politics” but Haidt is throwing his hat in with those atheists who feel they have to indulge in “Dawkins bashing” and kicking over the straw man of the “new atheism” caricature. This seems to be coming from his desire to promote the scientific understanding of the historical role of religion in binding societies and providing community. Sure, this ties in with his understanding of the evolution of human moral psychology – but he is hardly the one to discover it. Its a common feature of modern understanding of the evolution and role of evolution – and probably has been for a while.

Bloody hell, Daniel Dennett (who Haidt would describe as a “new atheist”) describes these features in his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon.

When Haidt says things like “religion is (probably) an evolutionary adaptation for binding groups together and helping them to create communities with a shared morality. It is not a virus or a parasite, as some scientists (the “New Atheists”) have argued in recent years” he is unfairly caricaturing these scientists. Sure concepts of memes, and evolution and movement of ideas in a way similar to viruses have been suggested by some scientists – as a mechanism, not a complete explanation of religion and ideology.

Haidt appears to have a lot to say about “new atheists” in his new book. I’ll have to wait till I have finished before making a final conclusion. But it seems to me that even to use the term “new atheism” is not scientific. Its a caricature, and one that is very often used dishonestly – like “strident atheist,” “militant atheist,” etc. I can’t help feeling that this is the political “centrist” Haidt talking (or even emotively venting) rather than the scientist Haidt.

There are of course attitudes, ideas and approaches that should be critiqued in science. But lets deal with the specifics, illustrated by examples, rather than myths and caricatures.

That said – so far I have enjoyed this book – and with the exception of these lapses, find it very convincing. Well worth reading.

See also: Chris Mooney – The Republican Brain

Answering questions on morality

I want to spend a few posts answering some of the questions commenters have raised on my science of morality articles here and at the SciBlogs syndicated version (Open Parachute@ SciBlogs). See, for example, Foundations of human morality.

Those articles represent my thinking as a result of the New Science of Morality  Seminar (see The new science of morality, Is and ought and A scientific consensus on human morality) and the Great debate “Can Science tell us Right from Wrong?” (See Telling right from wrong? for more details of this debate and workshop). Effectively I have tried to integrate the psychological approach of the Edge seminar with the more philosophical and neurobiological approach of the Debate. The reflection was also stimulated by reading books by Sam Harris (The Moral Landscape), Patricia Churchland (Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality), Jonathan Haidt, Marc Hauser, Matt Ridley, Stephen Pinker and others.

I have been very thankful for the discussion the articles generated. It’s a great way of developing one’s ideas. Finding flaws, looking for alternatives. Even when the disagreement is a result of misunderstanding, realising where one’s arguments need clarifying or better explanation is very useful.

I do not doubt the discussion has significantly contributed to evolution of my ideas in this area.

Questions from a religious apologist

Morality and politics

Jonathan Haidt has some interesting work on morality and politics. He describes it in the TED video below and in his recent paper (Liberals and conservatives rely on different moral foundations). It basically shows that conservatives and liberals give different weights to some moral intuitions.

Based on surveys and self declared political orientation individuals are scored for the intuitions of:

1: Harm and care

2: Fairness and reciprocity

3: In group loyalty

4: Authority and respect

5: Purity and sanctity.

The surveys consistently show conservatives ranking their intuitions for Purity/sanctity, authority/respect and in group loyalty higher than do liberals. This suggests that liberals and conservatives have different moral perceptions.