Collection of samples from the site of an alleged chemical attack in Saraqib, Syria, by a White Helmets “sample collection team” affiliated with “rebels”/terrorists in the area. OPCW Report on Saraqib incident.
Last week the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a new report on a chemical incident in Syria (see OPCW Fact-Finding Mission Confirms Likely Use of Chlorine in Saraqib, Syria). It claims “that chlorine was likely used as a chemical weapon on 4 February 2018 in Saraqib, Idlib Governorate, Syrian Arab Republic.”
Yet again this very political word “likely.” Unfortunately, the report displays the same sloppiness and lack of adherence to the OPCW’s own procedures which caused earlier reports to be discredited (see for example Chemical weapons use in Syria UN report flawed by political bias). In particular, no on-site inspections, no authentication of interviews or samples, and reliance on “rebel”/terrorist affiliated groups for their information and samples.
No, this is not the report we are waiting on – one dealing with the highly publicised alleged “chemical incident” in Duoma more recently. I certainly hope that one will be better – and the chances are it will because the OPCW was forced to handle this situation in a more honest way.
Whereas the Syrian government and the Russian armed forces asked the OPCW to send a team to Duoma to make its own investigations, the OPCW investigation of the Saraqib incident did not involve any on site inspection or sampling. The Saraqib report bases its conclusions simply on “open source” material and on samples and testimony provided by the jihadi-affiliated “White Helmets” (which unethically calls itself “Syrian Civil Defence”). For example – see this table extracted from the OPCW report.
Readers can download the OPCW report here – Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Saraqib, Syrian Arab Republic on 4 February 2018.
According to the Saraqib report (paragraph 4.3):
“The FFM (Fact-finding Mission) noted that during an investigation, complete, direct, and immediate access to the site of an allegation provides the greatest opportunity to collect information.”
Of course, this is the only way for such a FFM to produce a credible conclusion. This is particularly relevant to this specific case because instead of following its own recommended procedures for examination and establishing lines of custody the FFM relied on:
“examination of existing reports; assessment and corroboration of background information; conduct of interviews with relevant medical care providers, alleged casualties, and other individuals linked to the reported incident; review of documentation and records provided by interviewees; analysis of the signs and symptoms of victims as reported by interviewees; and receipt of environmental samples, for subsequent analysis.”
In practice the FFM report is simply based on testimony and samples provided by the “White Helmets/”Syrian Civil Defence” – a controversial organisation closely linked to the jihadis with a political policy of calling for NATO intervention in Syria and a record of falsifying video reports (see my previous articles on the “White Helmets”).
Paragraph 4.6 illustrates the complete reliance on such suspect sources:
“Through liaison with representatives of several NGOs, including Same Justice/Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria (CVDCS), the Syrian Civil Defence – also known as White Helmets – (SCD) and the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), the FFM contacted witnesses and confirmed their willingness to provide testimony and potential evidence. Furthermore, the FFM coordinated with the NGOs to organise movement of the witnesses. “
Why can’t (or won’t) Syrian opposition provide security guarantees for OPCW?
Of course, they justified this by claiming “various constraints, mainly related to security, have not enabled immediate access to sites by the FFM.” But there is no sign that the OPCW attempted to get security guarantees or even contacted the military units in the area. Nor is there any sign that the NGOs they relied on (the White Helmets and associated groups who are linked with the military groups in the area) made any attempt on their behalf to arrange for a site visit.
Duoma was also in a military active area. Syrian and Russian armed forces, together with a UN security team, provided security guarantees for the OPCW investigation team. A similar situation could have been organised in Saraqib – after all the area was under the military control of the jihadi militants.
In Duoma, Russian chemical weapons specialists carried out their own investigation and sampling – but, correctly, considered that an OPCW investigation would be far more acceptable to world opinion. The same procedure was used in the OPCW investigation of the Salisbury alleged chemical incident. Although they took subsamples of material collected by the UK authorities the OPCW team also took their own samples. This means that their report, if we ever get to see it (see OPCW on Salisbury poisoning – one step forward, two back?) can be more authoritative than one relying simply on UK samples.
Why should the OPCW consider the jihadi affiliated groups in Saraqib any more respectable or acceptable than the Russian (or UK) experts? If they had produced a report on Duoma using only Russian-supplied samples and testimony they would have been laughed at. Why do they expect us to accept an even less reliable or objective report for Saraqib?